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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

Tn the :.ratter of the Estate of
ROBERT L. PROUDFIT,
Deceased

ST~-\TE~IEXT

OF FAC'rS

Respondent agrees "·it h Appellant's sta tern en t of
facts. Ho\Ye,~er, \Ye are constrained to add that it is
not disputed that if any of the sPrYiee~ to tenants which
g·iye rise to the charges in controversy had been discontinued the tenants would ha,~e brought snit immediately for treble damages under the Federal Price Control
Act. Such suits would obviously waste the assets and
property of the estate. All of the disputed expenditures
were made prior to the filing of the inheritance tax
return, and while the property was subject to Federal
Rent Control Regulations. (R. 58 and 37)
Only actual expenses were claimed by the Re·spondent Executrix as deductions. Expenditures for capital
improvements, such as installation of a sprinkling system, were exclndecl by her from the deductions claimed
(R. il3).

All of the items claimed are the reasonable value
of the sen·iees and facilities ohtaine<l h)· Respondent
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Executrix, and all of them were necessary to preserve
the estate property -(R. 53). The testirqony in this
regard was not disputed.
STATEiMENT OF POINTS RELIED ON
RHspondent relies on the following points:
1. Each of the deductions allowed by the trial Court
and listed in Appellant's Statement of Errors was
properly allowed as costs or as expenses of administration under Section 80-12-8 U.C.A., 1943, as amended.

2. If not so allowable, each such deduction \Yas
properly allowed under said ~section as a debt owing by
decedent at the time of his death.
3. It is immaterial whether the expenses questioned
were paid out of rental income or out of the corpus of
the estate. (Appellant's brief, Question (3), page 10.)
ARGUMENT
Point 1. The deductions allowed are proper as "costs"
or "expenses" of adrninistratio11.
(a) At the outset we wish to call attention to one
aspect of this point which, it is believed, should determine this appeal in favor of Respondent.
Appellant concedes on page 11 of its brief that ''an
expense incurred in the preservation of decedent's estate
is a cost of administration" and ~s properly deductable.
This is of course the reasonable and general rule. The
testimony of Respondent's manager that all the claimed
2
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deductions were necessary to preserve the estate was not
disputed or impeached and must be taken as true. (Its
verity will become quite apparent as the nature of each
item is considered hereafter.) It follows from this alone
that the trial court's order allo,vin,g· the decluctions
should be affirmed.
(b) But there are additional grounds for affirming
the order appealed from.
The statute, Section 80-12-8, U.C.A., does not define
the term ''Costs of Administration'' nor the term ''Expenses of Administration." Nor has the Tax Commission promulgated any official regulation defining these
phrases. However, the Probate Coile prescribes the
mandatory duties of the Executrix in administering an
~state, and directs that she be allo,vecl her expenses incurred therein. From a consideration of the rlutie.c; of
admi'YI!istration there arises hy necessary inference an
inclusive definition of the expenses of administration.
Anything necessarily or reasonahl~, expended in the discharge of a duty of administration is neces~sarily an
expense of administration.
What, then, are the duties of administration?
Section 102-11-3, U.C.A., 1943, provides:
''The executor ... is entitled to, and rnust
take po,ssession of, all the real and personal estate
of the decedent, and shall receive the rents and
prof-i,ts of the real estate until the estate is settled or delivered over hy order of the Court to
the heirs or devisees; and must keep i11 ,r;ood
lf'naJilalJle repair all lumsf's, buildiJI.r;s aild fix:~
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.-l

tures. thereon which are under his control

"

(Italics added.)
And Section 102-11-24, U.C.A. 1943, provides:
"He (the executor) shall be allowed all necessary expenses in the care, management and settlement of the estate, including reasonable fees
paid to attorneys for conducting the necessary
... suits in court ... "
These sections were on our statute books as early
as 1898, and had long been in effect when the legislature,
in 1943, amended Section 80-12-8, U.C.A. 1943, to provide for the first time an inheritance tax deduction for
''costs and expenses of administration,'' instead of
merely for ''Court costs'' as had been provided until
that recent date. See Session Laws of Utah, 1943, Chap.
88, Section 1.
Obviously, where out tax statute, ·without defining
specially the terms it uses, refers to the '' administration" of estates and the "expenses" thereof, the long
standing statutes defining the duties of administration
and providing what expenses are allowable to the administrator, are in paria materia., and must be construed
together. Generally statutes are not to be considered
as isolated fragments of law, but as a whole, or as parts
of a great, connected, homogeneous system.
50 Am. Jur., p. 345, et seq.
It seems clear then, that the intention of the 1943
legislature was to allow as deductions all the expenses
incident to the collection of rents from real estate, the
expense of keeping all houses, buildings, and fixtures
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thereon in good and tenantable repair, and the expenses
of the care and management of the c>1·:date, as these arP
all official duties required of him. Any other construction would not only violate the rule of construction
referred to, it would also largely abrogate the effect
of the 1943 amendment to the tax statute, and it should
not be assumed that the legislature chang·ed and broadened the words without intending- to change and broaden
the meaning.
This court has had occasion to construe the two
quoted sections of the Probate Code in the case of
In re Hansen's Estate, 55
rtah 23, 184 Pac. 197.
The Court held that under the provisions of those sections the expenses of making repairs to existing buildings, su.ch as putting in nPw floors, or putting on a new
roof, or repairing existing fences, is a. proper expense
of administration. The Court further held that the
provision for allowance of necessary expenses in the
care and management of the estate is even broad enoug·h
to include such permanent improvements on the land
as are necessary for its occupancy and to preserve the
estate.
That case really goes even farther than is here
necessary to a decision affirming the order appealed
from.
For here we have expense:
1. For garden labor to maintain and preserve lawn,
shrubs, trees and flowers with which the real estate
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was improved. The Court, we submit, will take judicial
notice that in this climate land once cultivated, when
neglected and without irrigation or cultivation, rapidly
loses its value. It will even become a public nuisance,
overgrown with noxious weeds, subjecting the person
responsible to civil and criminal liability.
2. For labor and management service-obviously
necessary on so large a property to preserve the estate
and to discharge thE> executrix' duty to collect the rents
for the account of the estate.
3. For repairs to the heating system. This item is
within the exact letter of the statute and of the Hansen
case. Moreover, a complex mechanism, once out of
order, inevitably and rapidly deteriorates further unless
repaired immediately.
4. For heating the buildings. It is to be remarked
that all houses were heated by a central system, so that
the individual tenants could not themselves heat their
apartments. And we think the ( \mrt will take judicial
notice that no unheated house in Ogden was "tenautable'' in the ''Great Winter'' of 194-8-49. Furthermore,
without at least minimum heating the pipes would
freeze and burst and the estate would suffer waste and
material deterioration. Finally, the executrix t~ok on'r
this property at the death of the testator subjec-t to the
rights of the tenants therein. One of their rights, guaranteed by the Federal Price Control Act and the Rent
regulations, was to have the premises heated. The
executrix had no right to discontinue this service. If
she had attempted so to do she '''ould have been com()
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pelled by administrative and ( \mrt order to resumP,
and would have been subject to expensivP legal action
for trebled damages, which would han• wasted and
depleted the estate. (Of this, more later.) Nor could
she have performed her dnt~· to collect rents while
breaching the estate's duty to heat the buildings. She
expended only what she was rompellerl to expend to
preserve the estate and to perform her statutory dn1 ~·.
How then can it be said that this expenditure ''ras not
an ·~expense of administration''?
3. For '·general repairs'' necessary to maintain and
preserve the estate. This included repairs of broken
windows, blinds, plumbing and the replacement of a
floor which had been ruined. All are within the letiPr
of the statute and the Hansen case. All \n•rc mandator~·
duties of the executrix.
6. For (a) electric power furnished for street or
court lighting and for operation of the stoves and refrigerators, and (b) repairs to stoves and refrigerators.
The furnishing of power 'Yas n1andatory under the Rent
Control regulations, as was the heating previou·sly discussed. Outside lighting is also a reasonable safety
precaution to protect against mischief and hence is an
expense of administration. Repair of fixtures has already been discussed. It also was required hy rent cmltrol.
7..For water (a) used to irrigate and preserve the
real estate (previously discussed) and (b) supplied to
tenants (as required by rent control and testator's lease)
for domestic and culinary purposes. Surel~· at least
7
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some of this domestic water was used to clean and
preserve the improvements.
8. For insurance premiums on estate improvements.
Surely here is an expense reasonably undertaken purely
for the preservation of the estate.
It is respectfully submitted that all items fall within
the letter and the purpose and intent of the tax statute
authorizing deduction for "costs and expenses of administrration'' as properly constructed in the light of
the Probate Code provisions outlining- the duties of administration.

(c) There is further guidance to be gained from
In re Hansen's Estate, 33 l'tah
23, 184- Pac. 197, 204,
where this Court, in considering what are expenses of
administration, stated

''It is impossible to lay down any hard and
fast rule to govern in matters of this kind. Much
must necessarily be left to the judgment and
sound discretion of the trial judge ... ''
In this ease the trial judge has properly exercised
his judgment and sound discretion to allow the deductions in question as expenses of administration, all as
reported and returned to the Court. This ( 1ourt, in this
case should not interfere with the trial judge's exercise
of his discretion, in the absence of a showing of manifest abuse thereof. Certain]~· no such showing· has been
or can be made here.
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(d) Appell~nt in its brief contends that this Court
should reverse the trial Court and upset its exercise
of discretion because the Appellant's ag-ents have for
four years followed a practice of disallowing such deductions. Appellant·~ contention i~ unsound for several
reason~.

First, Appellant is merely a collector of the inheritance tax, and in respect thereto does not exercise the
quasi-judicial administratiYP function resulting· in rulings and decisions which give rise to a persuasive or
recognized admini~tratiYe cm1~truction. In the case of
inheritance tax the District Court (in Probate) alone
has jurisdiction to make such rulings. Section 80-12-35,
r.r.A. 1943. This has been recog11ized by the Appellant
collector in practice since the inception of the inheritance
tax, for it has neyer made any order fixing or determining deductions, or the tax itself, as to an estate in prohate, but all such questions have been uniformly referred to the Court. It is also interesting to note that
the Appellant Commission has llPYer attempted to promulgate a regulation on the subject. The case is quite
otherwise, of coursr, with the sales and income tax.
And, so far as we are advised, the specific question at
bar has never been submitted to a District Court for a
ruling since the statute allowing deductior) of administrath·e expense was enacted in 19-t-3.
We doubt that this point was callt><l to the Court's
attention when it was considered In re Cowan's Esta t0,
98 Utah 292, 99 Pac. 2d 605, cited h~· Appellant here.
~f oreover, in that cas<' the Dist rid Courts had for morP
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than 20 years ruled on the issue there involved.
case cited is not in point.

The

Second, the practice of the Appellant Commission
i1i this regard is contrary to the ciear meaning of the
law, and hence the doctrine is inappliooble. See
Utah Concrete Products Company vs.
State Tax Commission, 101 Utah 513,
125 Pac. 2d 408 .
.cited in Appellant's ·brief.
Third, the facts stipulated do not show an administrative interpretation within the rule. In the case of
E. C. Olsen Company vs. State Tax
Commission 168 Pac. 2d 324, 332.
cited by Appellant, the Court says:
''The facts of this case do not show a practical interpretation of the statute by the Tax
Commission. No regulations were passed specifically covering the questioned s~ales. Neither is
it shown that the Commission acted in close
harmony with the legislature in respect to legislation or proposals or as an advisory body to the
Legislature in reference to these or similar articles during the time they were not taxed with
knowledge that they were not taxed. . . Oral
statements of Tax Commission auditors do not
amount to administrative construction by the
Commission.''
There is no administrative construction of the
statute here in question to which the Court can gin•
consideration, serious or otherwise.
10
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(e) Absent its own regulation the Appellant Commission seeks comfort in Regulation 10;), Sections 81-:-t~
and 81 <~3. promulgated by the Federal Bureau of Internal Revenue, the Appellant stating that the Utah Tax
Commission is guided, whenever possible, b~· Federal
Regulations.
\Ye submit that these are entirely irrelevant. In
the first place the Federal statute on the subject provides for the deduction of such administrative expenses
''as are allowed by the laws of the jurisdiction . . .
under which the estate is being administered,'' so that
properly the Bureau of Internal Revenue mnst look to
our Probate Code and our Courts, rather than viePversa. See U.S. Internal Revenue Code, section 812 (b).
In the second place the Federal Courts themselves
have allowed deductions for analagous expenditures as
expense of administration in cases \\'hieh in many respects are not so strong as the one no·w before this
( iourt. See
Adams vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
110 Fed. 2d 578,
and
Estate of Fannie R. Brewer, I )n<'kPt No. 99711,
B.T.A., December 26, 1941; 10 Prentice-Hall B.
T.A. Mem. Dec., paragraph 41, :>7-1-.
Appellant contends that the expenses claimed as
deductions here were unnecessary and wen· not made iu
good faith for the benefit and preservatio11 of the PstatP,
hnt were incurred primarily in the production -of rental
income for the benefit of the devisee. If true, this con11
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tention might render less applicable the Adams and
Brewer Estate cases cited above. But it is not true.
The manager's testimony, which was not attacked, and
which the trial Court believed and found to be true,
was that all these expenses were necessarily incurred
to preserve the estate (R. 53), and that under Government fixed rentals the operation was not a money paying
proposition (R. 57).
And, as has been shown, every deduction claimed
(which did not include all of the expenditures in oonnection with the operation) was either in performance,
or a necessary prerequisite to performance of one or
another duty enjoined by law upon the Executrix, and
which was required to be performed in the course of
administration. Had she failed or refused to perform,
the estate would not have been preserved; it would inevitably have been wasted and depleted in several
obvious ways. How can it be said that in making expenditures forced upon her by law she was acting primarily for the profit of the devisee, even though in this
case it so happens that she is also the devisee~ The
devisee and the executrix are separate legal entities,
and in any other case they would be likely to be different persons.
Under these circumstances the fact that part of
the expenses were a necessary incident to the collection
of rent accruing after the date of testator's death is
immaterial. The property was rented at and before that
date. Under Rent Control regulations she could neither
terminate the tenancy nor refuse the established services
previously rendered to the tenants.
]:3
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(f) And as a matter of faet the collection of the rents
was necessary in order to raise moiH'Y to pay debts,
taxes, and expenses of administration. A glance at tlw
inventories (R. 1-l- and 19) discloses that there was less
than $5000 cash in the estate and that the only liquid
asset was First Sernrit~· Corporation stock worth
$~5~5.00. On the other hand expenses and obligations,
including Federal and State Inheritance Taxes, obviously total substantially more than $25,000.00 The fair
inference is the fact: the executrix' prime motive is,
first, to preserve the estate intrusted to her, and second,
to find some way to raise the money necessary to pay
the expenses, debts and obligations. A.ny realizable
profit, as sug·gested h~· Appellant, was just out of the
question.

The rent, of course, like the property of the estate,
was subject to proper disposition by the executrix in the
course of administration and the discharge of the obligations of the estate. This is made aboundantly clear
by the provisions of section 102-12-4, U.C.A. 1943, providing that· real estate is to be distributed only when
it does not appear that the rents, issues and profits
thereof are necessary to be received by the executor
to pay the debts ''of the estate.'' Note that the term
used is broader than the "debts of decedent."
All such obligations of the estate are of course
charges upon the corpus out of which the rent springs,
and estate taxes, both state and federal, are liens thereon
which it is the executor's duty to discharge by application of any funds legally available therefore.
1"')
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The common law rule is abrogated by the statutes
hereinbefore referred to, and the rents were properly
applied to administrative purposes. The devisee had
and has no right to object.
See also
In re Roessler's Estate,
160 Atl. 370 (N.J. Eq.),
Loscalzo vs. Eggner,
78 Atl. 607 (Del.), and
In re Bradfield's Estate,
221 Pac. 531 (Mont.)
It is respectfully submitted that the expenses necessary to collect the rents for payment of debts, taxes and
necessary to perform the obligations assumed by testator
as a landlord and which were prerequisite to rent collection, are ''expenses'' of administration and properl)T
deducta ble.
Point 2.

Said deductions are also allowable as deductions for debts ''owing by decedent at the time
of his death" under Section 80-12-8, P.C ..-1.
1943.

With the possible exception of the items for "management services" and insurance premiums (items 2 and
9 of Appellant's brief, p. 9-), which are clearly deduc·
table as administrative expense, all of the deductions
are also proper as debts of the decedent.

It is not disputed that the testator in his lifetime
rented all of the housing units in question to the tenants
\vho occupied them after his death and during the
period in question. Nor is it disputed that he, in hi~

14
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leasing arrangements with them contracted and agreed
to furnish the serYices involved, and that the premises
and the agreements for servire were subject to O.P.A.
rent regulations.
It is elementary that the executrix and the devisee
take possession and title to the testator's land subject
to all of the outstanding estates, charges, and covenants
made or created by the testator during his lifetime.
They get no better title than the testator. The testator
of course could not collect the rents unless he performed
the covenants which were part of the consideration
therefor. Neither could the executrix collect the rents
in performance of her statutory duty without perform
ing testator's obligations and covenants which he had
contracted in his lifetime.
The3e obligations were clearly "owing" by the
decedent at the time of his death" \Yithin the meaning
of the controlling statute, even though they ·were continuously performable during the term of the leases of
which they were a part. They were "owing at the time
of his death" quite as much as testator's promissory
note payable in monthly installments would be. They
were "owing" even though not all "due" at the date
of death. This construction is clearly within the letter
as well as the purpose and intent of the statute.
Nor did the executrix have any power or ri:!;·ht to
cancel that portion of the obligation not yet due or performable. Under Rent Control Regulations the change
of ownership was no excuse for termination of the tenmw~· and the obligation or covenant for services in effect
l;j
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"ran with the land" even more effectively than an old
common law covenant or easement could, for highly
penal statutes and regulations, as well as the equitable
remedy of injunction, ·were available to compel performance.
See, in this connection, the Emergency Price ( \mtrol Act of 1942, as amended, especially Title 50 r.s.
C.A. App., Section 925, as amended by Act of July 30,
1947, Ch. 361, Title I, Section 101, 61 State. 619, and the
Controlled Housing and Rent Regulation Section 825.1
as amended July 1, 1948, Section 3, relating to minimum
services. See also Housing and Rent Act of 1947, Section 209, as amended effective April 1, 1948 (Published
with the Rent Regulation last referred to), relating· to
evictions.
See also Controlled Housing Rent Regulation Section 825.6 as amended April 5, 1949, relating to evictious.
It is clear that under the circumstances existing,
the refusal of the executrix to honor the continuing obligations of the testator to the tenants would have resulted
in actions for trebled damages with concomitant expense, which would certainly have depleted the estate.
Hence it follows, as has been pointed out heretofore,
that the expense of honoring those obligations to avoid
such depletion is an expense of administration.

It is also clear that such obligations constitute debts
of the estate which must be discharged. The fact that
no claims were filed, or that they were not approved
b~T the Court prior to payment is immaterial. No claims
Hi
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are required on debts or obligations where performance
is not due until after death.
It is generally the duty of the executor to perform
decedent's executory contracts not terminated by death,
such, for example, as a building· contract.

2 Bancroft's Probate Practice
Section 528, pp. 967, et seq.
If there is no default in a land contract until after
death, it is not necessary to present a claim.
Burdick vs. Kerkovecz, 254
Pac. 684 (Cal.)
And the right to exercise an option to purchase corporate
stock owned by decedent is not barred by failure to
present a claim .
.Johnson vs. J ohnsou,
286 Pac. 109 (Colo.)
The obligation of a deceased lessee to place the demised
premises in the same condition at the end of the term
is not a "claim" against the estate, but it is a liability
of the executor, where the breach did not occur until
after death.
~athan vs. Freeman, 225
Pac. 1015 (-:\[out.)

Moreover it is proper to allow credit to the personal
representative for money expended in payment of liens,
the discharge of which is necessary to the preservation
or the estate. See
3 Bancroft's Probate Practice,
Section 964.
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See also
3 Bancroft's Probate Practice,
Section 785.

It is obvious that the performance of all such obligations in effect depletes the value of the estate received by the heir or devisee, whether the same must be
paid out of the corpus of the estate or out of the rents
to accrue during administration. In the latter case the
value of the corpus is definitely and adversely affected
by and to the extent of the claims and obligations which
are a charge thereon, and on the rents springing therefrom. It would seem therefore that on reason as well
as under the law these obligations, which can in fact
only be ascertained in the conrse of administration, an'
just as valid as deductions as are debts which must be
filed as claims under the non-claim statute.
It is therefore respectfull.v submitted that the deductions in question, even if not properly allowed as
expenses of administration, were properl~, allowed as
debts due at the time of decedent's death.
Point 3.

It is immaterial w-hether thP expenses questioned were paid ont of rPJdal inrome 01· out
of the corpus of the estate.

Under Question 2 of Appellant's brief, Appellant
gives considerable consideration to the question of
whether the expenses claimed should be taken out of
rental income produced by reason of such expenditurf•s.
See Appellant's brief, pages 18 to 27 inclusive. As we
view it, this is entirely immaterial. Under the statutes
of Utah the rentals are subject to the payment of all
18
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proper expenses of administration and debts of the
estate, as has been shown. The tax statute allowing
the deductions does not place any limitations on the
allowance by reason of the source of the money used to
pay the obligations allowed. Let us suppose, for the
sake of argument, an estate in which there were no
money to pay expenses of administration, including
court costs and attorneys' fees, and the devisee of the
real estate, in order to prevent the sale thereof for the
purpose of paying these expenses contributed to the
executor in cash the amount necessary to pay the Same.
The money so used would be even more obviously the
private property of the devisee than it is in this case,
and yet we apprehend it could not seriously he said that
these court costs and attorneys' fees so paid would not
be a proper deduction for inheritance tax purposes.
At the argument before the trial Court, the Appellant here argued strenuously that the allowance of these
deductions, when there was rental income from which
they might be paid, was contrary to the· general scheme
or philosophy of the Inheritance Tax· Law of Utah. But
tax laws rarely follow with legal nicety the close reasoning and logic which are characteristic of the development of the common law through judicial decision. Deductions and exemptions are frequently allowed by the
legislature, either as a matter of policy or as a matter
of grace, whether or not it is strictly logical so to do and
whether or not it results in a tax lower than would be
paid if rules of strict logic and reason were applied
to the situation. If the deductions here claimed fall
within the letter and general intent of the statute, in-
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terpreted in the light of statutes existing when it was
adopted, then the trial Court properly exercised his
discretion to allow them.
It does not appear that the cases cited and relied
upon by the AppeUant here were decided under statutory
provisions of the kind in effect here in Utah, and for
that reason they are quite inapplicable.
Where, as here, rental as well as the corpus of the
estate is liable for the payment. of the obligations of the
estate, it is quite immaterial whether the deductions
claimed have or could have been paid out of rental rather
than out of the corpus. The deductions are proper in
either event.
CONCLUSION
Under the facts and the law as hereinbefore outlined, it is respectfully submitted that the trial Court
properly interpreted the law and properly exercised the
discretion vested in him by the law to allow the deduetions as expenses of administration, that even if they
were not properly expenses of administration they are
properly deductable as debts of the decedent existing
at his death, and that in any event the order of the trial
Court is proper and should be affirmed.
Respectfully su hmi tted,
PAUL THATCHER
OF THATCHER

&

YOUNG,

1018 First Security Bank Bldg.
Ogden, Utah
Attorneys for Respondent
L.._ ·--- .. - .......... ;;....._ ..... ~ .... , •
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